Management Adviser
Volume 11

Number 4

Article 7

7-1974

Frequency of Information Flows: A Misunderstood Management
Variable
Robert L. Paretta

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtadviser
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons,
and the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
Paretta, Robert L. (1974) "Frequency of Information Flows: A Misunderstood Management Variable,"
Management Adviser: Vol. 11: No. 4, Article 7.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtadviser/vol11/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Management Adviser by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Sometimes very high data processing speed can ac
tually be a handicap to the company employing it.
Obviously, very fast flow is important in an airlines
reservation system, but that’s not equally true of
production scheduling—

THE FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION FLOWS:

A MISUNDERSTOOD MANAGEMENT VARIABLE
by Robert L. Paretta

University of Delaware
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Intuitively it might appear that
more frequent information should
always be preferred by the firm to
less frequent. If for the moment it
is assumed that increasing the fre
quency of information flows has a
zero marginal cost, a plausible re
sponse to the questions posed
above might be to increase report
ing frequency in all decision cen
ters to the maximum technically
possible.
Unfortunately, however, this will
not improve a decision maker’s per
formance in every
amination of three specific examples
will make this point clearer.
1. Decisions Improved—There are
some decisions where management
performance can be improved by
increasing the frequency of reportManagement Adviser

ing to the maximum. The kinds of
critical control processes found in
the generation and transmission of
electric power, the refining of oil,
and the production of chemicals—
where remedial action must be im
mediate, or nearly so, to prevent
unpleasant consequences or avert
a disaster—are good examples of
how the firm can benefit from very
rapid information flows. In addi
tion, the installation of on-line-realtime systems for handling passen
ger reservations has often been
cited as the major factor in allow
ing airlines to improve service to
the public at lower cost with
smaller fleets by permitting more
efficient allocation of available air
craft space.
Using the approach suggested by
Bedford and Onsi for measuring
the value of information by com
paring the outcome of the actions
of the decision maker before and
after the receipt of a message,1 the
effects of information frequency on
the profitability of the firm can be
depicted graphically as in Exhibit
1, page 48. In Frame A of Exhibit
1, the curve shows the result to be
expected in the case of the critical
control processes outlined above;
the value of information is highest
when the reporting cycle (the time
between an event taking place and
the receipt of a report) is zero, and
drops off sharply becoming value
less when the unpleasant conse
quences the system is designed to
guard against occur.
2. Decisions Unaffected—Other
kinds of decisions can be noted
where increasing the frequency of
reports will have no effect on the
manager’s performance and hence
will produce no benefits to the
firm. This is common when the de
cision maker is unable to act on
more frequent data because of
queuing, scheduling, or capacity
constraints. For example, providing
daily sales and inventory informa
tion to someone responsible for
1—Bedford, Norton M. and Mohamed
Onsi, “Measuring the Value of Informa
tion—An Information Theory Approach,”
Management Services, January-February,
1966.
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production scheduling would be
meaningless if it were neither tech
nically nor economically feasible to
reschedule production runs daily.2
Furthermore, with regard to vari
ance analysis, problems of non
linearity can make shortening the
reporting cycle of little value.
Dearden demonstrates this quite
well:

“In the area of performance eval
uation, real-time management in
formation systems are particularly
ridiculous. When a division man
ager agrees to earn, say, $360,000
in 1966, he does not agree to earn
$1,000 a day or $1,000/24 per
hour.”3

In this situation the messages
transmitted to the decision maker,
at least at the high frequency dis
cussed, have no rational basis for
being supplied. In Frame B of Ex
hibit 1 it can then be seen that
where reporting cycle is a shorter
time period than that necessary to
take action, the value of informa
tion (and therefore the effect on
profitability) is zero. As the report
ing cycle increases to a point con
sistent with the ability to act on
information received, the value in
creases sharply to a maximum, then
falls as the information gradually
loses its usefulness to the decision
maker.
3. Decisions Hindered—Finally,
two conditions can be identified
under which management perform
ance and profitability can actually
suffer when information frequency
is too high. First, when dealing
with data that is very unstable, in
creasing the frequency of informa
tion flows substantially enlarges the

probability of introducing random
variations in the reports received
by a decision maker. A message
containing data that is the result of
a random fluctuation not represent
ative of the events being observed,
may transmit a false signal to the
manager causing him to take action
when none is appropriate. This can
prove harmful to the firm when the
cost of taking the wrong action is
high, compared with the cost of
not acting and waiting for more
information.
Second, increasing the frequency
of reporting can cause problems
where the time necessary to evalu
ate information received is longer
than the reporting cycle. A situa
tion could develop where the man
ager is supplied new information
before he has had the opportunity
to fully evaluate information re
ceived- in the prior period. Receiv
ing the new information would
make his analysis-in-process obso
lete and he would very likely post
pone a decision until the most re
cent information was evaluated. If
the decision maker reacted in this
way to every new piece of relevant
information he received, a condi
tion could develop in the extreme
case where a decision would never
be made. Evaluating, updating,
and re-evaluating problems would
be a continuous closed-loop proc
ess with no exit for positive action,
unless the frequency was reduced
to a rate in phase with the analyti
cal time frame demanded by the
decision. Though somewhat exag
gerated, this example demonstrates
that there is an opportunity cost
associated with a manager being
exposed to information too freROBERT

2—This is not to imply that this data is
intrinsically valueless, for it may have
value at high frequency for some other
kind of decision, or have value for this
decision if it is gathered in the system
and stored for later review. The point
being made is that the value of informa
tion is a function of many variables in
cluding frequency.
3—Dearden, John, “Myth of Real-Time
Management Information,” Harvard Bus
iness Review, May-June, 1966, p. 126.
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EXHIBIT I
The Value of Information Expressed as a Function of Frequency

quently. Reinforced is the fact that
a decision maker’s time is a scarce
resource that must be efficiently al
located by the firm.
Frame C of Exhibit 1 shows that
in this case, where the reporting
cycle is too short, the value of the
information is negative until a
point is reached beyond which ran
domness and the decision’s analyti
cal lead-time are no longer factors.
As the reporting cycle increases,
the value rises to a maximum level,
then declines as the usefulness of
the information to the manager
fades with time.

Analysis of costs and benefits
By looking at the three classes
of decisions above, it was quite
easy to show that increasing the
frequency of information flow can
have a variety of effects on profita
bility-even when it was assumed
to have been achieved free of addi
tional cost. Relaxing this assump
tion introduces a new set of prob
lems for all classes of decisions.
If the firm is to maximize the
utilization of its scarce resources,
the expected cost of providing in
formation at a given frequency
must be matched against the ex
pected benefit of receiving more
frequent reports. In a world of cer
tainty, given a specific decision, the
process of matching costs against
benefits can be readily accom
plished. In the real world, however,
costs and benefits can be difficult
to determine for several reasons.
First, not all costs and benefits
readily lend themselves to mea
surement in monetary terms. Some
may be of a behavioral nature. The
organizational structure of the firm,
the intensity of budgetary pressure
within the firm, the degree of sta
bility in the demand for the firm’s
products, and the trend of that de
mand, are just a few of the things
that can influence the way some
managers perceive their “needs”
for information at given frequen
cies. A large part of these per
ceived needs may be emotional,
and, in fact, may far exceed the
frequency rates that are warranted
48
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by the decisions involved. Never
theless, to deny information at the
frequencies managers feel they
“need” may result in poor perform
ance because of the resultant loss
of confidence they surely will suffer.
Second, since decisions within
the firm are interrelated, benefits
and costs, even if measurable, may
be difficult to isolate. In the ex
amples cited above three classes of
decisions were examined in a kind
of vacuum, and it was easy to iden
tify the consequences brought
about by changes in the frequency
of information flows. But in the
real world this is neither possible
nor appropriate because it ignores
the fact that the firm is composed
of a system of interrelated deci
sions where the decision output of
one decision center often becomes
the input for another decision cen
ter. The direction of the links be
tween and among decisions can be
vertical, horizontal, or even circu
lar, all with numerous points of
intersection. Separating the costs
and benefits under these circum
stances is not quite as simple as it
might first appear.

Conclusions
There is a popular belief that in
creasing the frequency of informa
tion flows will improve a manager’s
performance. In this article, it has
been explained why this is not al
ways the case. Careful analysis
must be made of (1) the frequency
needs of given classes of decisions,
and (2) the interaction effect of
decisions made in one decision
center on other decision centers.
In order to achieve this, several
factors must be kept in mind:

1. The sensitivity of the decision
process—As an example, it was
shown that where a process has the
potential to produce serious conse
quences when permitted to go out
of control, very frequent informa
tion (perhaps to the point of con
tinu
ous monitoring) might be need
ed to avert disaster.
2. The flexibility of the decision
process—It was shown that certain
July-August, 1974

kinds of processes (like production
run scheduling) which allow man
agers to take action only at specific
intervals (after which the firm is
committed to a course of events
that does not readily lend itself to
modification until a discrete point
in the future), make it necessary
for information to be supplied at
frequencies in phase with the given
interval. To supply it more often
would result in a misallocation of
the firm’s scarce resources.
3. The variability of decision in
put data—It was shown that in
cases where the decision input data
is unstable, raising the rate of in
formation flow tends to increase
the probability that a message sent
to a manager will contain data that
is not representative of the events
being observed. This could transmit
a false signal to the manager caus
ing him to take action where none
is called for.
4. The analytical lead-time re
quired by the decision process—
Every decision process has associ
ated with it what might be called
“analytical lead-time”—that is a pe
riod of time before a decision can
be made when information is eval
uated and analyzed. If the informa
tion flow is more rapid than the
analytical lead time, it was shown
that the manager’s performance
could suffer as a result of being
saturated with more information
than that with which he can effec
tively deal.
5. The cost of information vs. the
benefits received—If the firm is to
efficiently allocate its scarce re
sources, the cost of providing infor
mation at a given frequency must
be matched against the expected
benefit of receiving it. It was
shown how this matching is often
very difficult in the real world.

If the firm is to maximize

the utilization of its scarce
resources, the expected cost
of providing information

at a given frequency must
be matched against the
expected benefit of receiving

more frequent reports . . .
In the real world . . . costs

and benefits can be difficult
to determine for several
reasons . . .

Though the above list of factors
does not purport to be exhaustive,
it represents those which should be
of immediate interest to individuals
responsible for designing the firm’s
information system. If the fre
quency of information flows is to
be a meaningful management vari
able, these factors must be con
sidered.
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